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Objections to deliberative democracy state that culturally plural societies are too diverse to be able to enact such a concept, that social groups who are marginalized in these societies would not have the access or ability to participate in such decision-making processes. This essay argues that deliberative democracy is applicable to these societies and may be the only method of addressing historical injustices through the reconciliation process, shared stories and perceptions of a common good.

 

 “First we argue for equality, by appealing to the arbitrariness of the natural lottery. Then we allow departures from equality provided that these are not worse for those who are worst off. This explains why, in Rawls’s phrase, the worst-off have the veto, so that benefits to them should have absolute priority.” Parfit (2000, p.121)

 

Theorists of deliberative democracy assert that democracy relies upon notions of a common good and an egalitarian ideal, and also that democracies should be developed to encourage civic responsibility and self-respect. While many modern societies are culturally plural, as long as a system of government allows for a fair system of bargaining that is representative of all groups, these theorists think that it will be a legitimate system (Cohen, 1997). This essay will look at the different concepts that underpin deliberative democracy and assert that such a democratic process is both applicable to a modern, pluralist society and that collective choice will also lead to better understanding between the different groups that inhabit these societies.

John Dryzek’s “Discursive Democracy” (1990) was the first book written about deliberative democracy. Dryzek states that ‘the final decade of the second millennium saw the theory of democracy take a strong deliberative turn’ (Dryzek, 2000:1).  The opportunity to participate became the imperative in asserting effective deliberation and claims for or advocated by others could be justified in terms that would be acceptable to the participants. For Dryzek (2000), deliberative democracy should not be confined to strict forms of ‘public reason’ but should be able to engage in more tolerant positions that include testimony, humour, emotion, storytelling, argument, rhetoric and even gossip. He contends that this would help deliberation in a non-coercive way and rule out dominant powers manipulating outcomes or attempting to enforce an ideological conformity.

This also explains how deliberative democracy has come to be seen by some as being too chaotic and unmanageable through inclusion, and yet by others as being too restrictive through exclusion. For these objections even the idea of rational argument is elitist and exclusive to those who cannot explain themselves comprehensively (Dryzek, 2000:5). However, Dryzek’s inclusion of story allows those that do not have the same worldview as the dominant group to come to an arena of democracy and show through narrative why their preferences might be the ones that are chosen by the collective. Indigenous people can benefit from democracy in this way, instead of having to rely upon the political representation of someone who has little concept of their worldview or culture.

Jürgen Habermas developed the concept of deliberative democracy, basing its legitimacy in reason. Democracy, asserted Habermas, is supposed to encourage free critical reasoning about common affairs designed to guide the practice of coercive powers (Cohen, 1999:386). Joshua Cohen states that one of the reasons that Habermas contended that democracy should be deliberative, was to ensure the impartial justifiability of outcomes (Cohen, 1999:402). John Rawls (1972) also reflected this in his thinking about political decision-making where his principle of participation required fair political equality. Deliberative democracy relies upon the participants engaging in free deliberation amongst equals as the basis of their legitimacy and Cohen (1999) thinks that in this way deliberative democracy is able to address pluralism within a democratic process. Citizens find resolutions to problems of collective choice through public reasoning and establishing a framework for deliberation. It is a plural and diverse association that is committed to resolving problems through collective choice. This is assisted through each party not reaffirming self-interested or mandatory preferences or ideals.

The first step in collective choice is choosing an agenda, then the proposal of different solutions to that agenda with supportive reasoning, and finally settling upon an agreed solution. While all comprehend the necessity of their own good, in deliberative democratic decision-making they also share a commitment to finding decisions that are acceptable to all, even if it involves revising one’s own preferences and beliefs. Deliberation requires critical reasoning because it is not enough in pluralistic societies for people to provide reasons for decisions being based upon preferences, beliefs or ideals. The notion of autonomy is also important in a deliberative democracy, as preferences should be formed by agency rather than circumstance. Therefore, deliberation consists of assessing the common good from the basis of legitimate public reflection on what is an appropriate claim on public resources, rather than notions of preconceived ideas and interests (Cohen, 1997).

Historical injustice means injustices that have occurred across generations from oppressive social practices and institutions. These social practices legitimise exclusion and oppress certain groups because their features mark them as inferior to others. Through this oppression these social groups are vulnerable to exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. If this oppression occurs over a long period of time they become historical injustices. Historical oppression is unique in that it formulates identity in terms of conflict and opposition, leaving a stigma even after reparations have been reparations have been attempted. Indigenous cultures that have been conquered by settler colonial powers are an example of historical injustice. In attempting to address the plural dimensions of historical oppression, democratic inclusion must find a way of resolving these issues (Bashir, 2012).

Benjamin Barber (Young, 1989: 256) highlights the opposition between the general interests of the civic polity and the particular interests of private affiliations. Barber states that concepts of the common group are not enforced from a position of authority but agreed upon as part of a common project. Although Barber states that notions of belonging to particular groups are important as well for people, it could be that concepts such as universal citizenship and deliberative democracy may require a degree of impartiality that humans may not be able to practice (Young, 1989). People understand polity from their particular perspective and the narrower their perspective the narrower will be their political view. This occurs in societies where some are privileged while other are oppressed. To recommend that all citizens leave their perspectives and interests behind merely reinforces the privileged position of some and fails to redress the oppression, all the while silencing it by ignoring the perspective of the oppressed. Young (1989) argues that Barber confuses plurality with privatisation, stating that pluralism encourages particular private interest groups to assert their interests over others. She goes on that instead of unified public realm that does not disregard the particular perspectives of individuals but acknowledges the ‘desire to decide together the society’s policies’ (Young, 1989:258). Therefore Young suggests that there should be specific representation of disadvantaged groups in order to enact affirmative action with regard to their participation in the greater group, the greater group already having a strong enough voice (Young, 1989:262).

An objection to deliberative democracy is that its treatment of basic liberties is unacceptable because it is dependent upon a majority decision and restricts the liberty of individuals. Cohen (1997) responds to this objection by stating that deliberative democracy entails informed and autonomous judgements through public deliberations in which free and civil expression is allowed to take place. In this way it includes the individual in decisions for the majority. Another objection is that public deliberation is, in reality, irrelevant to modern political conditions. It is basically an objection that direct democracy cannot occur in modern conditions because the nature of our states is too large and complex in both population and institutions. Especially with regard to the globalization of citizenship in large conglomeration states like the European Union, this objection states that it is difficult to encourage citizens under such conditions of diversity to consider themselves equal participants in acts of cooperative deliberation (Cohen, 1997). By ensuring that institutions engaged in deliberative democracy have arenas through which citizens propose and debate issues for the political agenda, this objection seems nullified. If these institutions can act across communities and states, through the use of social media and online translators people can engage with each other on a local, national and international level.

Habermas advocated such a communitarian approach to democracy based upon mutual communication. In this way deliberative citizenship can use narratives of shared experience to address thinner concepts of liberal theory and particular interest groups. John Dewey termed this type of deliberative vision as a ‘shared way of life’. For Immanuel Kant, without ‘enlarged thought’ or public engagement in the decision-making process that includes other perspectives there is a failure in the human community to live wisely. If one loses touch with public conversation one becomes sensorily deprived ( Boyte, 1995). Addressing issues in the public sphere that involve marginalised social groups, such as indigenous, disabled, or ethnic minority groups, a necessary part of the political process is allowing those groups to become engaged in decision-making. Approaches to this could be through the convening of town meetings where citizens can be involved in discussing problems, and ensuring that election coverage gives voices to a broad range of citizens, especially those that are marginalised, as well as representatives. Civic journalism also can play a role in revealing conditions that may be hidden from the general civic polity (Sirianni and Friedland).

To ensure that institutions work within the desired parameters of a deliberative democracy, it is necessary to understand that material inequalities usually mean political inequalities. Being from a remote or poor community can mean that you have little chance to engage in the democratic process because of lack of access. Therefore, political parties that are able to be supported through public funding are an important enabling feature of deliberative democracy. In this way material disadvantage in the political arena can be overcome and ensures the manifest equality that is a part of the Rawlsian view. Also, by providing a diverse enough range of issues parties can ensure that debate is not restricted to certain issues and provide more open-ended accounts that can properly inform diverse understanding of the common good (Cohen, 1997).

Objections to deliberative democracy on the grounds that it is either too inclusionary or exclusionary are counteracted by methods of storytelling that include people who might otherwise have their voices silenced. Deliberative democracy can provide a solution to the challenge of pluralism in its insistence that participants are able to engage with each other equally and with liberty of deliberation. Critical reasoning is essential for deliberative democracy because it helps to take the decision-making beyond personal preferences and beliefs. Deliberative democracy should also be viewed as an egalitarian approach. Furthermore, through such a Rawlsian egalitarian approach the difference principle can apply and reconciliation between the general community and disenfranchised groups can occur. This is especially important when it comes to redressing historical injustices.

Deliberative democracy is a way in which those who have suffered from historical injustices can be included in the process of decision-making in an attempt to resolve their issues. Elements of affirmative action are advocated to become part of the arena of deliberative democracy to ensure that those people whose voices are usually silenced, such as the marginalised or oppressed, are included in the decision-making process. Liberty and autonomy are able to be protected in the process of deliberative democracy through public decision-making with all free and civil voices being included.

Finally, although modern states are large and populous, smaller arenas, such as social media, where people can voice their opinions on issues are becoming more popular and varied across the political sphere. Civic journalism and publicly funded political parties are also a good way to make sure that those who have little chance to engage in the democratic process have their material disadvantage addressed. Therefore, if the objections to deliberative democracy are addressed then it should be a successful basis for addressing the claims of marginalised social groups.

REFERENCES:

  1. Bashir, B. (2012), “Reconciling Historical Injustices: Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Reconciliation”, in Res Publica, 18 (27), 2012, pp. 127-143
  2. Boyte, C.J. (1995), “Beyond Deliberation: Citizenship as Public Work”, Civic Practices Network, viewed on 5 May 2013 on http://www.cpn.org/crm/contemporary/beyond.html
  3. Cohen, J. (1997) “Deliberation and democratic legitimacy” in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics , Bohman, James; Rehg, William , 1997 , pp. 67-91
  4. Cohen, J.  (1999),”Reflections on Habermas on Democracy”, in Ratio Juris, 12 (4),December 1999, pp. 385-416
  5. Dryzek, J (2000), Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations, Oxford University Press Inc. New York
  6. Rawls, J., (1972), A Theory of Justice, Clarendon Press, Oxford
  7. Sirianni, C., & Friedland, L. (n.d.), “Deliberative Democracy”, Civic Practices Network, viewed in 5 May 2013 on http://www.cpn.org/tools/dictionary/deliberate.html emocracy reliescieties. cess ise issues.ther too inclusionary or exclusionary are conteracted by habit these societies. cess is
  8. Young, Iris Marion. “Polity and group difference: A critique of the ideal of universal citizenship” Ethics , 99:2 , 1989 , 250-274
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John Rawls’ “Theory of Justice” (1972) explains how social cooperation needs a system of justice and gives a basic idea of what justice means to the structure of society. Rawls presents the primary concept of justice as being fairness, an abstract extension of the social contract described by such philosophers as Locke, Rousseau and Kant. In Rawls’ theory, however, the social contract is replaced by a concept of an original position which allows for an original agreement on the principles of justice. Rawls contrasts this with the classical utilitarian view (p.3).

Rawls first considers the role of justice. He states that while society is seen as the cooperation of people for mutual advantage it also produces conflict through competing interests. Although social cooperation is the best way for people to better their lives there is a conflict of interests because people dispute inequalities of distribution of the products of society, or the goods produced through such cooperation. People tend to prefer a larger share to a lesser share. Therefore a set of just principles are needed to assign the rights and duties within societal institutions and define how benefits and burdens of societal cooperation are best distributed (p.4)

A just society is one where all know and accept the same principles of justice and the social institutions reflect these principles. Rawls maintains that human society needs a just charter to establish the limits of the pursuit of other ends and bring people with different aims and purposes together. Existing societies are usually in dispute about questions of justice. Rawls states that despite this they still have a concept of justice as being a set of principles that assign rights and duties and determine distribution of societal goods (p.5). For Rawls, the principles of justice should first identify the similarities and differences between people when establishing such assignments and distributions. Rawls states that individuals need to interact positively with each other so that their activities are compatible with each other and their plans can be carried through without infringing unjustly upon the rights of others. The outcomes of their plans should be compatible with justice. When justice is the priority of a social system it can be said that one notion of justice is preferable to another when its wider consequences are more beneficial (p.6).

Rawls next considers how best justice can serve a social system. He states that a just society’s institutions protect freedom of thought and conscience, free markets, private property, and the monogamous family. However, Rawls contends that such institutions are arbitrary in that there are inequalities within society that can affect an individual’s chances in life. Therefore, Rawls states that it is necessary for the principle of social justice to attend to these inequalities first in order to regulate the just economic and social system (p.7). Rawls goes onto say that it might be an idealistic theory but it provides the basis for the understanding of civil disobedience and allows an analysis of ‘the nature and aims of a perfectly just society’ (p.9).

Rawls puts forward the notion of an original agreement which posits that free and rational persons concerned with furthering their own interests would accept an initial position of equality (p.11). It is stated by Rawls that just as rational thinking determines what is in a person’s best interests so too can it also be extended to a group of people deciding what is just and unjust. So, Rawls describes a hypothetical original position which argues that there is no way of knowing where one’s place in society will be, what natural assets or liabilities they may have, or their intelligence or strength. Because of this, Rawls maintains that ‘the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance’. In that way no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles of justice through inequalities of social circumstance (p.12). For Rawls the original position ensures ‘that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair’. Therefore, Rawls states, when the social system enacts such principles of justice people will be able to cooperate with one another ensuring that their relationship is a fair one (p.13).

Rawls finally concludes that it would be questionable whether once these principles of justice, based upon an original agreement of equality, were in place that a principle of utility would be allowed. Rawls thinks that it is unlikely that people who consider themselves equal would allow a principle of justice that would require some to suffer inferior life prospects so that a greater utility could be enjoyed by a majority. In this regard utilitarianism seems incompatible with the notion of ‘social cooperation amongst equals for mutual advantage’. Instead of the principle of utility, Rawls contends that the person in a position of equality under the original agreement would choose two defining principles:

1)      that there is equality in the assignment of rights and duties;

2)      that inequalities of wealth and authority are only allowed if they result in compensating everyone, and especially the least advantaged.

Therefore, Rawls thinks that these principles rule out the utilitarian concept of allowing hardships for some if they are offset by a greater good for the many (p.14).

For the sake of survival rational people do not wish to be violated by others and they rely upon a system of justice to protect them from such violations. For Rawls, each person possesses such an inviolability based upon justice and the welfare of society as a whole cannot impinge upon these individual rights. For what if members of the majority were in the position of the minority, they would also want such a right to inviolability to be respected. Rawls argues that justice does not allow the loss of freedom for some to be made right by the greater good of the many. The accident of birth should not determine one’s liberties and for it to do so would be arbitrary rather than just. Under the veil of ignorance and the original position Rawls contends that each person would choose a society where they would respected with dignity even if they are a minority group. Rawls concludes that utilitarianism contradicts these basic precepts of justice, particularly those that concern liberty and rights. A utilitarian society is simply regarded as an efficient means through which the spreading of benefits can occur, and does not take into account the difference between persons. “Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests” (p.3).

  • Rawls, J., (1972), Theory of Justice, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Global protest has been prominent since the late 1990s. It is a reaction to dominant forces of multinational corporations undermining democratically elected governments, and the people’s own identity through citizenship, across the globe. For a few years these protests were quelled because of the threat of terrorism. However, since the new global financial crisis that began in 2008 which evidenced the complete and utter disregard that these corporations, citing their status as natural persons, have had for the real occupants of the world, new protest movements are burgeoning everywhere. It is imperative that we contemplate the vastness and autonomy of these corporations and perceive how global governance must be consolidated to be able to harness such forces for the peace and security of all. Therefore, a global social contract must be established.

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Monoprints by Janet Elizabeth Thomas (2010)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sorrell and Hendry define a narrow code of ethics within business as that which is restrained only to its employees or shareholders[1]. A broad code of ethics is that which includes responsibilities to the wider community and environment[2]. Although most codes of ethics define responsibilities to communities, some businesses find that their particular responsibilities to the pursuit of profit for shareholders constrain and conflict with these policy objectives[3]. However, businesses operate in and rely upon the communities where they are situated. The people within these communities expect to be treated equally and fairly by governments and businesses. This essay will argue that a broad code of ethics is needed in the application of inclusive principles, such as the concepts of equal opportunity and affirmative action, and that such inclusive principles can benefit the businesses that apply them.

The expectations and ideals of equality do not reflect the real differences between peoples’ physical and psychological abilities. When these types of real inequalities are transferred to a business environment so that it can reflect political equality, these issues can become problematic[4]. A narrow ethical objection could be: Why is it the responsibility of business to compensate individuals for these real inequalities? To consider these responsibilities, it is useful to consider the laws that are in place and how they are enacted.

The anti-discrimination laws, such as the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), legislate that all employers must fairly treat their employees and potential jobseekers[5]. As such, they reflect the impartiality of the law and appeal to normative ethical approaches of equality and fairness. All employees are entitled to equal opportunities and employers must not allow prejudices or stereotyped views to influence their decisions about hiring or treating people that they employ[6]. The only reason that an employer can legally justify an action of discrimination is if it would cause unjustifiable hardship to them[7]. This type of legislation recognizes the equality of people but also preserves fairness to business.

This legislation means that businesses must operate with a broad code of ethics when it comes to dealing with equal opportunity. These policies began to be enacted in the 1980s as a response to the disadvantages women suffered in the workforce[8], and were extended and implemented by the human resources department of some organisations as a program entitled Managing Diversity (MD)[9]. The main concept of an MD program is to increase competitive advantage through being able to access a diverse workforce. This is supposed to meet employee needs, reduce turnover costs and give the best customer service[10]. At the same time, governments have relaxed the legislative requirements and penalties for breaches[11] and affirmative action legislation has been negated to a certain degree[12].

The use of MD programs has become an answer for corporations subject to equal opportunity requirements. It is seen to broaden the ethical requirements rather than restricting them to the narrow environment of legislated affirmative action[13]. MD programs are also considered to focus upon the positive aspects of diversity rather than the negative aspects of disadvantage[14]: ‘“Managing diversity- the new paradigm” is internally driven, rests on a business case and perceives MD as an investment and difference is perceived as an asset’[15]. Therefore, it seems that business has broadened the scope of the ethics involved in equal opportunity and lobbied to narrow the legislative requirements that were brought about to give access to work for the disadvantaged. Has this broadening of the ethical scope resulted in better access for those who potentially benefit from equal opportunity legislation?

It has been alleged that many companies, such as Microsoft and Coca Cola, simply pay lip service to their espoused equal opportunity policies, with suspicions that policies are a process in image management and are not enshrined in practice[16]. In Britain, while Equal Opportunity (EO) policies have been adopted by many companies, only a quarter of companies surveyed arranged to consult disabled employees, and only half allowed time off for rehabilitation and treatment[17]. It is asserted by Jewson et al.[18] that the four reasons that companies adopt EO policies are:

  1. 1.      as an ‘insurance policy’ against future claims against their reputation;
  2. 2.      to demonstrate employer responsibility;
  3. 3.      as a response to problems created by community pressure; and
  4. 4.      to access a wider talent base or to expand the customer client base.

It is the final reason, that of accessing an expanded base of talent and customers, that should be considered the most important reason for a company to properly attend to equal opportunity policies. It is simply good business.

While EO legislation allows for a company to object to employing someone if it would cause them unjustified hardship, not employing people on the basis of gender, reproductive capability, ethnic origin, disability or age is also unjustified. It denies those effected access to life’s opportunities. Objections to EO policies on the grounds that they do not address primary societal differences in housing and education[19] fail to recognise that having work helps to relieve people from the trap of poverty and allows them access to quality housing and education.

The broadening of the ethics of business to include EO policies is in line with many other policy implementations that have occurred throughout the last century. Businesses have to deal with wage issues that reflect true living costs and conditions that enable workers to be able to have enough security to be a secure workforce. These issues are regulated and are beneficial to businesses because they ensure access to a reliable workforce. Health and safety regulations are also issues that businesses now have to deal with and they benefit through not having to pay for lengthy court cases and compensation claims that can occur after the event. This is similar to anti-discrimination regulations. These regulations give businesses access to a diverse workforce that truly represents the societies in which these businesses operate.

The concept of using a MD program has the advantages for businesses and the community of being internally-driven policy that can be linked to organisational objectives, and being less restrictive than an external EO agenda that demands a set of minimal targets[20]. The main concept of EO policies is that they use a white, heterosexual male as the norm and try to fit other groups into this, whereas MD is about diversity and expects that the mainstream will be a diverse group[21]. It responds to objections to EO policies, being reverse discrimination towards white males[22], by highlighting demographic difference. In this way, MD is able to be sensitive to labour needs and clientele differences which can improve productivity, employee commitment and profitability[23].

A broad ethical approach by any business to concepts of equal opportunity and affirmative action are based upon good reason. These concepts reflect the principles of equality and fairness in our society. They also reflect good business judgments about acting within the self-interest of a company and its shareholders, in that they broaden the scope of access to employees and customers. Finally they reflect the intuitive and universal Kantian concept of acting towards others as you would have them act towards you. It must be remembered that all of us can be affected, broadly or narrowly, by such inequalities as gender difference, ethnicity, disability or age.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. De Cieri, H. and R. Kramar, 2003, Human Resource Management in Australia, McGraw Hill, Sydney
  2. Gaze, B. 1998, “The Ambiguity of Affirmative Action in Australia”, in Law in Context, (1998), vol. 15 no. 2
  3. Grace, D. & Cohen, S. 1995, “Ethical reasoning in business” in Business Ethics , Grace, Damian; Cohen, Stephen, 1995, pp.1-51
  4. Hettinger E.C. 2001, ‘What is Wrong with Reverse Discrimination?’ in W. Michael Hoffman, Robert E. Frederick & Mark Schwartz (eds.) Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality, 4th edition (McGraw-Hill, New York, 2001), pp. 315-322
  5. Hoque, K. & Noon, M. 2004, “Equal Opportunities Policy and Practice in Britain: Evaluating the ‘Empty Shell’ Hypothesis”, in Work, Employment & Society,British Sociological Association, September 2004, vol. 18 no. 3, pp. 481-506
  6. Jewson, N., Waters, S. and Harvey, J. 1990, “Ethnic Minorities and Employment Practice: A Study of Six Employers”, Research Paper No. 76, Sheffield: Employment Department
  7. Jewson, N., Mason, D., Lambkin, C. and Taylor, F.,1992,  “Ethnic Monitoring Policy and Practice: A Study of Employers’ Experiences”, Research Paper No.89, London: Department of  Employment
  8. Jewson, N., Mason, D., Drewett, A. and Rossiter, W., 1995, “Formal Equal Opportunities Policies and Employment Best Practice”, Employment Department Research Series No. 69, Sheffield: Employment Department
  9. Pojman, Louis P. “The modern workplace: transition to equality and diversity: The moral status of affirmative action” in Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality , Hoffman, W. Michael; Frederick, Robert E.; Schwartz, Mark S. , 2001 , 303-315
  10. Sorell, T. & Hendry, J. 1994, “Narrow and broad business ethics” in Business Ethics , Sorell, Tom; Hendry, John , 1994 , pp. 28-54
  11. Strachan, G., Burgess, J. & Sullivan, A. 2003,  Affirmative Action or Managing Diversity- What is the future of Equal Opportunity Policies in Organisations? Faculty of Business and Law, University of Newcastle, NSW
  12. The Anti-Discrimination Board, “Discrimination and the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW”, ADB factsheet, viewed on: 30 July 2012 http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/adb/ll_adb.nsf/vwFiles/Disc_ADB_0311.pdf/$file/Disc_ADB_0311.pdf


                [1] Sorrell & Hendry, 1994, “Narrow and broad business ethics” in Business Ethics, Sorrell, Tom; Hendry, John,1994, p.28

                [2] Sorrell & Hendry, 1994, p.28

                [3] Sorrell & Hendry, 1994, p.28

[4] Grace & Cohen, 1995, p.144

[5] The Anti-Discrimination Board, “Discrimination and the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW”, ADB factsheet, p.1, viewed on: 30 July 2012 http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/adb/ll_adb.nsf/vwFiles/Disc_ADB_0311.pdf/$file/Disc_ADB_0311.pdf

[6] The Anti-Discrimination Board, 2012, p.1

[7] The Anti-Discrimination Board, 2012, p.2

[8] Strachan, G., Burgess, J. & Sullivan, A. 2003,  Affirmative Action or Managing Diversity- What is the future of Equal Opportunity Policies in Organisations? Faculty of Business and Law, University of Newcastle, NSW, p.1

[9] Strachan et al. 2003, p. 1

                [10] De Cieri, H. and R. Kramar, 2003, Human Resource Management in Australia, McGraw Hill, Sydney, pp. 28-29

                [11] Strachan et al. 2003, p. 3-4

                [12] Strachan et al. 2003, p. 5

                [13] Strachan et al. 2003, p. 5

                [14] Strachan et al. 2003, p. 5

                [15] Strachan et al. 2003, p. 6

[16] Hoque, K. & Noon, M. 2004, “Equal Opportunities Policy and Practice in Britain: Evaluating the ‘Empty Shell’ Hypothesis”, in Work, Employment & Society,British Sociological Association, pp.481-482

[17] Hoque & Noon, 2004, p. 483

 [18] Jewson, N., Waters, S. and Harvey, J. 1990, “Ethnic Minorities and Employment Practice: A Study of Six Employers”, Research Paper No. 76, Sheffield: Employment Department; Jewson, N., Mason, D., Lambkin, C. and Taylor, F.,1992,  “Ethnic Monitoring Policy and Practice: A Study of Employers’ Experiences”, Research Paper No.89, London: Department of  Employment; Jewson, N., Mason, D., Drewett, A. and Rossiter, W., 1995, “Formal Equal Opportunities Policies and Employment Best Practice”, Employment Department Research Series No. 69, Sheffield: Employment Department

[19] Pojman, Louis P. “The modern workplace: transition to equality and diversity: The moral status of affirmative action” in Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality , Hoffman, W. Michael; Frederick, Robert E.; Schwartz, Mark S. , 2001 , p.314

[20] Strachan et al., 2003, p.6

[21] Strachan et al., 2003, p.6

[22] Hettinger, E.C., 2001, ‘What is Wrong with Reverse Discrimination?’ in W. Michael Hoffman, Robert E. Frederick & Mark Schwartz (eds.) Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality, 4th edition, pp. 315-322

[23] Strachan et al., 2003, p.6

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Nils Holtug argues for the Value of Existence View which makes ‘the comparative claim that existence can be better (or worse) for a person than non-existence’ (p.370). Derek Parfit and John Broome argue against this view by stating that it is incoherent. Parfit argues that causing someone to exist cannot be better for a person because the alternative would not have been worse. Broome argues that it can never be true that it is better for a person to exist than to not exist because if she had not existed there would not have been a ‘her’ to have been worse off.

The argument set out by Parfit and Broome is called the Metaphysical Argument and it relies upon two premises. The first premise makes the judgement that it is better (or worse) to exist than never to exist and entails that it is worse (or better) to not exist than to exist. The second premise is that it cannot be worse (or better) to not exist. The first claim, Holtug states, is based upon the logic of ‘betterness’ relation, and the second premise is based upon the metaphysical principle called The No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. This means that an individual cannot have any properties if it does not exist.

This principle can be disputed. Broome’s argument relies upon the point that if a person does not exist then it is impossible for any properties to be attached to her. Holtug contends that the logic of betterness relation that the argument relies upon assumes that in order for existence to be worse than non-existence, non-existence must be better than existence. To explore the logical properties of the betterness relation, Holtug considers the following definition:

1)      y is worse for S than x, if and only of x is better for S than y.

If (1) states that existence if better (or worse) for a person than non-existence, non existence is better (or worse) for her. The latter part seems to violate the No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle. It seems to ascribe to her the property of being worse (or better) off in a possible world in which she does not exist. According to this principle we cannot claim that existence is better for her than non-existence because this implies that non-existence is worse for her than existence. So Holtug reassesses the argument with the proposition:

P: Non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence.

Can the truth of P be established without ascribing to Jeremy positive properties in a possible world in which he does not exist? Holtug claims that P can be established by appeal to a preference that Jeremy has in an actual world in which he exists. Existence may be preferable for Jeremy because he prefers existence to non-existence. Jeremy’s life includes a surplus of positive value, whereas his non-existence had no value. Holtug insists that this is compatible with The No Properties of the Non-Existent Principle; it is better to have a surplus of values than no value. The Metaphysical Argument is not preserved because the Value of Existence View does not rely upon someone existing for the possibility of them benefiting from existence.

  • Holtug, Nils. “On the value of coming into existence” Journal of Ethics , 5:4 , 2001 , 361-384

Christine Overall argues that a reasonable view of abortion needs to entail both concern for the autonomy of a woman and the well-being of the embryo/fetus. The main objection to abortion has been until now that it results in the death of the embryo/fetus. However, with new reproductive technologies abortion can now consist of two quite distinct aspects. One is the premature emptying of the uterus and the other is causing the death of the embryo/fetus. These two aspects pertain to the rights argument of the abortion issue: the right of the pregnant mother to the control of her own body and the alleged rights of the embryo/fetus.

Overall contends that recent developments in reproductive technologies means that these causally linked events will no longer necessarily have to result in the death of the embryo/fetus. This has been brought about through in vitro fertilisation, where the embryo at an early stage of its development need not be dependent on the occupancy of a uterus. Also, the age of viability of a fetus has decreased so that, with the help of sophisticated support systems, a fetus may be able to survive outside of the uterus. In Overall’s view these new possibilities has opened up the ability to discuss the rights of both the mother and the embryo/fetus.

The conservative position on abortion claims that the embryo/fetus has the right to life. However, Overall states that this is not necessarily true and a better argument is that the pregnant woman or anyone else, such as a physician, has the right to kill an embryo/fetus. Overall quotes Mary Anne Warren who remarks that if abortion could be performed without endangering the embryo/fetus then the woman would never have the right to destroy it. Not having the right to life does not necessarily imply that one being can kill another. This seems to go against the liberal approach to abortion but the distinction is between the ability to expel the embryo/fetus from the uterus without harming it and causing the death of the embryo/fetus.

However, from the liberal view the embryo/fetus has no right to the occupancy of another’s body. A woman’s goal in obtaining an abortion is not necessarily to kill the embryo/fetus but just may be a desire not to be pregnant for whatever reason and abortion can be seen primarily as an emptying of the uterus. If there was a way to preserve the embryo/fetus’s life and respect the woman’s desire to not continue with a pregnancy, then Overall thinks that the evacuation of a uterus that causes no harm to the embryo/fetus or the mother would be the best possible result that could resolve the longstanding issues of abortion.

The implication for this, in Overall’s view, is the transfer of the moral quandaries involved with abortion to other moral dilemmas. These could be dilemmas such as the consideration of whether there will be a moral obligation to preserve all evacuated foetuses. Also, if embryos could be adopted through evacuation and implantation in a willing mother should all embryos become candidates for adoption?

  • Overall, Christine. “Abortion” in Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis , Overall, Christine , 1987 , 68-87

Ronald Dworkin points to a distinction between reasons people wish for their lives to go one way or another. One set of reasons he calls experiential preferences and the other set of reasons are critical interests. Experiential preferences are those things that we find enjoyable in life. They also can entail things that are painful or bad experiences but, within limits, these kinds of experiences do not make our whole life worse. Critical interests, Dworkin asserts, are those that people find are essential to their understanding of what constitutes a good life.

Experiential interests are not frivolous and critical interests profound, Dworkin states, it is just that critical interests are important to the aspirations of our lives. In his view, we need to establish the distinction between these two interests in order to understand how people should be treated. It is not difficult to understand why we care about our experiential interests as it is natural to prefer pleasure to pain. But it is more difficult to understand why people should care about their critical interests. Therefore, Dworkin contends that we need an intellectual explanation of how our critical interests connect with the larger beliefs that we have about life.

Critical interests are bound in what Dworkin calls the integrity of our lives; the capacity we have to autonomously structure our lives to contain the right experiences and achievements. Integrity is similar to dignity, which is why we think someone has little self-respect if they have acted perversely for gain or the avoidance of trouble. It is important to understand that one may be mistaken in the decisions one makes for understanding the idea of critical interests. For Dworkin, this is essential to the basic distinction between critical and experiential interests.

In using such a distinction to consider whether death is in the best interests for someone with dementia, Dworkin thinks that we must consider what was important in that person’s life; what was their life narrative. Someone who has dementia may have more to gain through pleasant experience for several years before they die a natural death and to kill oneself through the fear of a lack of experiential interests is probably wrong.  However, Dworkin argues, it is critical interests that matter when we wish to consider how one might die. If people think that they will be living in degrading conditions through being fully dependent then they may wish to choose to die. Therefore Dworkin asserts that these decisions based upon their critical interests before they were afflicted should be taken into account when considering how an advanced dementia patient may not wish to live.

Rebecca Dresser objects to Dworkin’s differentiation between experiential and critical interests on the grounds that it is possible that people do not draw a sharp line between these interests. In the circumstances of dementia, Dresser says, Dworkin fails to consider that critical interests become less important and experiential interests more so, just as they may for people who are brain damaged or intellectually disabled. Dresser states that people who seem happy and contented although they may be suffering from dementia, will experience clear harm from a decision that purports to advance the critical interests that they may no longer care about.

  • Dworkin, Ronald. “Dying and living” in Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia , Dworkin, Ronald , 1993 , 179-217
  • Dresser, Rebecca. “Dworkin on dementia: Elegant theory, questionable policy” in Bioethics: An anthology , Kuhse, Helga Singer, Peter , 1999 , 312-320