In philosophy intentional states mean the directing of one’s thoughts towards some object or idea. The philosopher Fred Dretske investigated the claims of the late philosopher Roderick Chisholm who argued that intentional states could only be mental states. This claim was derived from the thesis of the nineteenth century philosopher Franz Brentano in his 1874 book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. This essay will explore the claims made by Chisholm and Dretske and ascertain the validity of their arguments as to whether the all the contents of the mind are physical or mental states.

A feature of mental states is their content. For example, when I see a cat, I am perceptually aware of that cat, or when I believe that it is going to rain, my belief represents a state of the weather. David Chalmers (ed. 2002, p. 473) states that a feature of mental states is defined…

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