janetthomas

brainmap

The concept of modularity within the mind has been expounded by its adherents since 1983 when Jerry Fodor wrote “The Modularity of the Mind”. While Fodor claimed that modularity was confined to input systems such as perception and language (Robbins, 2010) others, such as Carruthers, have since put forward theories for massive modularity of the mind which include modules for high-level cognition such as beliefs, problem-solving and planning (Robbins, 2010). Carruthers’ theory of massive modularity rests on the criterion that mental processes must be encapsulated systems. For Carruthers, they would be weakly encapsulated, while for Fodor they would have limited accessibility but complete encapsulation (Robbins, 2010).

Prinz (Prinz, 2006, p.22) uses Fodor’s (1983) criteria for modularity to contend that input systems and central systems are not modular. Jesse Prinz’s argument against modularity within the mind is based upon his view that the mind, alternatively, contains systems that are distinguished by…

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