Spartans and Helots: Was it a history of class struggle?

The Spartan relationship with those that they conquered was designed to maintain their superior strength as a fighting power. To do this they needed an underclass of workers who could maintain the living standards of their society. Those that they subjugated within the Peloponnese were called Helots, and they fulfilled this role. To consider whether this relationship could be described in terms of class struggle it is necessary to identify who the Helots were, their particular role in Spartan life, their reaction to this role, their treatment by the Spartans and its eventual effects.

THE HELOTS

Excepting for a few Achaean centres, when the Mycenaean period ended in about 1200 BCE it was followed by a severe depopulation of the Peloponnesian peninsula. In about 1000BCE, the Dorians, a northern migrant-warrior tribe invaded and settled Laconia. This occupation of the land happened over a long period, with any pre-Dorian population being used as slave labour or expelled, as the Dorians were not an agricultural people[1].

The city of Sparta began as a conglomeration of villages on the Eurotas River[2], on a site founded in the early tenth century that was previously uninhabited, evidenced by the absence of Mycenaean sherds[3]. About ten kilometres south of Sparta was Amyclae, the centre of the Laconian Achaeans. It was captured by the Dorian Spartans in the middle of the eighth century adding a fifth village to the four villages of Sparta. The land of Helos at the mouth of the Eurotas River was also subjugated[4]. In this early Spartan period of settlement and occupation social conditions developed that were the result of a relationship between the conquerors and the conquered[5].

Being a warrior community of small numbers, the Dorian-Spartans needed others to work the land for them. The land was divided into lots and tilled by the conquered, that filled the role of serfs, or Helots [captives[6] ], and provided the livelihood for their masters. These early Helots were made up of a pre-Dorian agricultural community[7]. The Spartans, being a dominant force and increasing in number, acquired land in the west, north and south[8], but in particular the land of Messenia in the west of the Peloponnese.

This led to the First Messenian War around the latter part of the seventh century[9]. After the battle for the Messenian’s mountain fortress at Ithome, the Spartans were victorious and turned the inhabitants into Helots[10]. The seventh Spartan poet Tyrtaeus describes the Messenians paying tribute to their new masters ‘just like donkeys, worn down by heavy burdens[11]. This burden was great, in that Helots had to deliver half of their crop to their Spartan masters[12]. Yet there were many of them and consequently they became a threat to the Spartan state.

Although the expansion of Spartan territory into Laconia and Messenia doubled the state’s size and resulted in whole populations being subjugated into serf-like primary producers, it also found the Spartans constantly having to control ‘an enemy within’[13]. Unlike slaves elsewhere in Greece who were bought and sold by individual masters at will, Helots were not of disparate origin but born only in Laconia or Messenia and not sold beyond these lands[14]. Ehrenberg states that ‘it was the Messenians who ever afterwards threatened to revolt against Sparta’[15]. Forrest also asserts that through their numbers, their race and their identity, being of Messenian or Dorian-Greek origin, these Helots were a constant threat to Spartan society[16].

THE ROLE OF HELOTS IN SPARTAN SOCIETY

Surface surveys conducted in southwest Messenia show isolated settlements across the landscape, rather than individual farmsteads. This suggests that Helots lived together on estates and under some surveillance, not spread out in small family groups on cultivated land[17]. Xenophon saw the Helots as being integral to the Spartan state, much like slaves elsewhere[18]. Other than agricultural tasks, the functions performed by Helots were as domestic servants, wet nurses, grooms, attendants to Spartans on military campaigns, as well as troops and even hoplites between  424-369BCE[19]. Kennell thinks that Helots may have been owned individually[20]. Xenophon writes that the Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus allowed anyone to borrow another’s hunting dogs, horses or helots[21], which suggests that they were considered private property[22]. However, this could also mean that, rather than being owned, they were considered part of an individual’s share of the common good.

Helots did have a form of property and marriage rights and some form of social life. Talbert argues that, for some Helots, life must have been good through having some influence and power in administrating property while the owners were away fighting or in the city. This meant that they might profit from their work and their loyal military services and might suggest an acceptance of their position[23]. Herodotus states that Helots were used as troops in the Battle of Thermopylae in 480BCE[24] (Herod. 6.80; 8.25), and at the Battle of Plataea in 479BCE there were seven armed helots to one Spartan hoplite[25]. There was a substantial drop in the Spartan population during the fifth century and therefore the number of Helots required serving in Spartan military expeditions increased[26]. Being small in number and located in the city itself unless on official business, the Spartans must have left the Helots to their own devices much of the time[27].

The territory of Sparta was extensive and difficult with many mountain ranges isolating various areas. Spartan households used a large amount of domestic attendants to do tasks such as wool-working that were normally carried out by women in other areas of Greece[28]. As a Spartan’s whole life was training for war, the whole orientation of society needed an enslaved population to assist this and constructed their lifestyle to make this hierarchy. In this way, the Helots were fundamental to the Spartan economy[29]. To rely for their survival on the helots the Spartans had to turn their city into a military barracks, but the compensation for this meant that Sparta became one of the most powerful cities in the Hellenic world[30]. However, this also resulted in Sparta having to devote much energy to asserting its power over the Helots and, until the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BCE; it involved a constant rebalancing of benefits and dangers[31].

HELOT REACTION TO INFERIOR ROLE

Talbert asserts that the longevity of Helot submission is more significant than Helot rebellion, and the fact that population numbers remained high points to general well-being[32]. The helots had the advantage of being in a country that was protected from outside invaders. It was also a country where the masters had limited literary or cultural interests, therefore it is unlikely that isolated Helots would have been politically interested. As Sparta’s neighbours were all oligarchies, rather than democracies like Athens, it would appear that there was little chance for political organisation for the Helots, being isolated and uneducated[33]. As Helots infrequently came into contact with free people, this situation may have changed with the use of Helots in military expeditions in the early fifth century.

While the first revolt of the Helots came in the latter half of the seventh century, the Spartans took years to quell the rebellion and suggests a cause for the ongoing tensions between the Spartans and the Helots. While there are no accounts of rebellion in the sixth century, there are more than a few accounts of Helot disloyalty or conflict in the fifth and fourth centuries. By the time of Thucydides it seems that Spartan society was designed to keep it secure against the Helots[34].

Thucydides[35] states that all Helots, whether Laconian or Messenian were called Messenian, which suggests that the Spartans saw them all as potential dissidents[36].  An earthquake that devastated Sparta in 465/4 BCE[37] had an immediate effect upon the helots, with those in Messenia revolting and again being garrisoned in their mountain stronghold at Ithome. It was not until a decade later that there was a compromise[38]. However, Xenophon writes that by the late fifth century the Helots would have been happy to eat the Spartans raw[39].

SPARTAN TREATMENT OF HELOTS

In the Parnian area of Sparta a seventh century pattern can be seen through site surveys of small single-family farmsteads and hamlets. Surveyors surmise that these were evidence of the perioeci, free people who were neither helots nor Spartans. After the middle of the fifth century these decrease sharply indicating Spartan security concerns after the earthquake[40]. All Spartan treaties with their allies had a clause calling for assistance in case of a helot uprising[41] , and the Spartan state allegedly maintained an annual declaration of war against the helots through the use of a secret service of young warriors who would murder unsuspecting helots[42].

A fragment from Myron[43] tells of how the Spartans forced the Helots into the most insulting and degrading positions in order to reinforce their inferior position, even to the point of giving a death sentence if they looked too robust. Plutarch cites the practice of making Helots get drunk within the Spartan common dining halls as a form of humiliation designed to reinforce their inferior status[44]. Also, during a siege at Sphacteria during the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides wrote that many Helots came to assist the Spartans who offered them silver and freedom[45]. Later 2000 of these Helots were alleged to have been executed by the Spartans in fear that they had become too powerful[46].

Spartan apprehension of Helots is highlighted by them sending seven hundred with Brasidas to Thessaly[47] during the Peloponnesian War. When they returned in 421BCE they were freed by the state and offered land at Lepreum becoming known as ‘Brasedeoi’[48] and part of a new class of Neodamodeis [‘new men’]. This new status for Helots may have been a state action to balance the societal problems that arose through the stark inequalities of the Spartan/Helot relationship[49]. However, while they were granted land in return for military service, they were not granted citizenship[50]. There is also evidence of the state allowing Helots to be freed in exchange for helping besieged Spartans with food and also on the eve of the Theban invasion of 369BCE. However, so many volunteered to be hoplites that the Spartans retracted their offer in fear that they were arming their enemy[51].

CONCLUSION

It appears that with the severe decline in Spartan population during the fifth century, there was a need for Spartans to rely upon Helots as a fighting force which contradicted the underpinnings of their society, where Spartans were the soldiers and Helots were the workers. However, the longevity of the relationship over centuries between Spartans and Helots infers that the relationship was much like that of serfs in medieval society. Although there were periods of unrest the relationship relied upon a mutual security which could not be completely undone unless there was a significant change in political outlook. This change may have occurred with the use of Helots in more military expeditions, allowing them to observe other relationships and societies outside of their own isolated experience and being the likely cause of demands for freedom in the fifth and fourth centuries. Therefore, as population decline was a major contributing factor to the eventual demise of Spartan society, it would seem that Cartledge overstates the role of class struggle in Sparta.

 

REFERENCES:

1. Cartledge, P. (2009), Ancient Greece: A History in Eleven Cities, Oxford University Press, New York
2. Ehrenberg, V. (1971), From Solon to Socrates- Greek History and Civilization during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., Methuen & Co Ltd, London
3. Forrest, W.G., (1968),  A History of Sparta: 950-192 B.C., W.W. Norton & Co., New York
   1. Herodotus, The Histories, viewed 16 April, 2013 on http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0126
   2. Kennell, N. (2010), Spartans: A New History, Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex
   3. Pausanius, Description of Greece, 4.14.4, viewed 19 April 2013 on http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0009%3Achapter%3D6%3Asection%3D8
   4. Plutarch, Lycurgus, viewed 17 April, 2013 on http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0047%3Achapter%3D28%3Asection%3D5
   5. Thomas, R.M., (n.d.), An Overview of Classical Greek History from Mycenae to Alexander, 6.8 viewed 20 April 2013 on http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0009%3Achapter%3D6%3Asection%3D8
   6. Talbert, R.J.A. (1989) “The role of the Helots in the class struggle at Sparta”,  Historia , 38:2 , 1989
   7. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, viewed 15 April, 2013 on http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0200
   8. Xenophon, Anabasis, viewed 15 April 2013 on http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0202
   9. Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, viewed 15 April 2013 on http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0210%3Atext%3DConst.+Lac.
   10. Xenophon, Hellenica, viewed on 16 April 2013 on http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0206

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[1] Ehrenberg, V. (1971), From Solon to Socrates- Greek History and Civilization during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., Methuen & Co Ltd, London, p. 29

[2] Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.10.2

[3] Ehrenberg, (1971), p.29

[4] Ehrenberg, (1971), p.30

[5] Ehrenberg, (1971), p.31

[6] Cartledge, P. (2009), Ancient Greece: A History in Eleven Cities, Oxford University Press, New York, p.75

[7] Ehrenberg, (1971), p. 31

[8] Ehrenberg, (1971), p. 39

[9] Ehrenberg, (1971), p. 34

[10] Ehrenberg, (1971), p. 35

[11] Thomas, R.M., (n.d.), An Overview of Classical Greek History from Mycenae to Alexander, 6.8

[12] Pausanius, Description of Greece, 4.14.4

[13] Cartledge, (2009), p. 75

[14] Kennell, N. (2010), Spartans: A New History, Wiley-Blackwell, West Sussex, p. 81

[15] Ehrenberg, (1971), p. 35

[16] Forrest, W.G., (1968),  A History of Sparta: 950-192 B.C., W.W. Norton & Co., New York, p.31

[17] Kennell, (2010), p.81

[18] Kennell, (2010), p.79

[19] Kennell, (2010), p.81

[20] Kennell, N. (2010), p. 82

[21] Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, 6.3

[22] Xen., Hellenica, 6.4.11

[23] Talbert, R.J.A. (1989) “The role of the Helots in the class struggle at Sparta”,  Historia , 38:2 , 1989 , p.31

[24] Herodotus, The Histories, 6.80; 8.25.1;

[25] Herod., 9.10.1; 9.29.2; 9.30

[26] Talbert, (1989), p. 23

[27] Talbert, (1989), p.33

[28] Xen. Lac. 1.3-4

[29] Cartledge, (2009), p. 71

[30] Cartledge, (2009), p.81

[31] Forrest, (1968), p. 39

[32] Talbert, (1989), p. 32

[33] Talbert, (1989), p.30

[34] Thuc. 1.132.4-5

[35] Thuc. 1.101.2

[36] Talbert, (1989), p. 37

[37] Thuc. 1.101.2

[38] Thuc. 1.103. 1-3

[39] Xen. Hell. 3.3.6; Anabasis 4.18.4

[40] Kennell, (2010), p.81

[41] Talbert (1989), p. 34

[42] Plutarch, Lyc., 28.2

[43] Talbert, (1989), p.36

[44] Plut, Lyc. 28.4

[45] Thuc. 4.26.5-6

[46] Thuc.4.80.3-4

[47] Thuc. 4.80.5

[48] Thuc. 5.67.1, 71.3, 72.3

[49] Thuc. 5.34.1

[50] Talbert, (1989), p. 27

[51] Xen. Hell. 6.5.28-9

The Coming of the Cardinal

Creation Myths from Greece and Ancient Near East are humanity's attempts to be like the gods

Reblogged from janetthomas:

The concepts of myths in ancient societies dealt with the difficult aspects of human existence such as death, despair and defeat. However, besides being etiological in content they also had a strong purpose as charter myths, validating authority or unifying dispersed peoples. This essay will explore how the emergence of creation from an abyss, humanity’s quest to be like the gods and their subsequent defeat are the basic elements of all the creation myths from this part of the world.  

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Rawls’ Theory of Justice: Why it is more just than classic Utilitarianism

John Rawls’ “Theory of Justice” (1972) explains how social cooperation needs a system of justice and gives a basic idea of what justice means to the structure of society. Rawls presents the primary concept of justice as being fairness, an abstract extension of the social contract described by such philosophers as Locke, Rousseau and Kant. In Rawls’ theory, however, the social contract is replaced by a concept of an original position which allows for an original agreement on the principles of justice. Rawls contrasts this with the classical utilitarian view (p.3).

Rawls first considers the role of justice. He states that while society is seen as the cooperation of people for mutual advantage it also produces conflict through competing interests. Although social cooperation is the best way for people to better their lives there is a conflict of interests because people dispute inequalities of distribution of the products of society, or the goods produced through such cooperation. People tend to prefer a larger share to a lesser share. Therefore a set of just principles are needed to assign the rights and duties within societal institutions and define how benefits and burdens of societal cooperation are best distributed (p.4)

A just society is one where all know and accept the same principles of justice and the social institutions reflect these principles. Rawls maintains that human society needs a just charter to establish the limits of the pursuit of other ends and bring people with different aims and purposes together. Existing societies are usually in dispute about questions of justice. Rawls states that despite this they still have a concept of justice as being a set of principles that assign rights and duties and determine distribution of societal goods (p.5). For Rawls, the principles of justice should first identify the similarities and differences between people when establishing such assignments and distributions. Rawls states that individuals need to interact positively with each other so that their activities are compatible with each other and their plans can be carried through without infringing unjustly upon the rights of others. The outcomes of their plans should be compatible with justice. When justice is the priority of a social system it can be said that one notion of justice is preferable to another when its wider consequences are more beneficial (p.6).

Rawls next considers how best justice can serve a social system. He states that a just society’s institutions protect freedom of thought and conscience, free markets, private property, and the monogamous family. However, Rawls contends that such institutions are arbitrary in that there are inequalities within society that can affect an individual’s chances in life. Therefore, Rawls states that it is necessary for the principle of social justice to attend to these inequalities first in order to regulate the just economic and social system (p.7). Rawls goes onto say that it might be an idealistic theory but it provides the basis for the understanding of civil disobedience and allows an analysis of ‘the nature and aims of a perfectly just society’ (p.9).

Rawls puts forward the notion of an original agreement which posits that free and rational persons concerned with furthering their own interests would accept an initial position of equality (p.11). It is stated by Rawls that just as rational thinking determines what is in a person’s best interests so too can it also be extended to a group of people deciding what is just and unjust. So, Rawls describes a hypothetical original position which argues that there is no way of knowing where one’s place in society will be, what natural assets or liabilities they may have, or their intelligence or strength. Because of this, Rawls maintains that ‘the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance’. In that way no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles of justice through inequalities of social circumstance (p.12). For Rawls the original position ensures ‘that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair’. Therefore, Rawls states, when the social system enacts such principles of justice people will be able to cooperate with one another ensuring that their relationship is a fair one (p.13).

Rawls finally concludes that it would be questionable whether once these principles of justice, based upon an original agreement of equality, were in place that a principle of utility would be allowed. Rawls thinks that it is unlikely that people who consider themselves equal would allow a principle of justice that would require some to suffer inferior life prospects so that a greater utility could be enjoyed by a majority. In this regard utilitarianism seems incompatible with the notion of ‘social cooperation amongst equals for mutual advantage’. Instead of the principle of utility, Rawls contends that the person in a position of equality under the original agreement would choose two defining principles:

1)      that there is equality in the assignment of rights and duties;

2)      that inequalities of wealth and authority are only allowed if they result in compensating everyone, and especially the least advantaged.

Therefore, Rawls thinks that these principles rule out the utilitarian concept of allowing hardships for some if they are offset by a greater good for the many (p.14).

For the sake of survival rational people do not wish to be violated by others and they rely upon a system of justice to protect them from such violations. For Rawls, each person possesses such an inviolability based upon justice and the welfare of society as a whole cannot impinge upon these individual rights. For what if members of the majority were in the position of the minority, they would also want such a right to inviolability to be respected. Rawls argues that justice does not allow the loss of freedom for some to be made right by the greater good of the many. The accident of birth should not determine one’s liberties and for it to do so would be arbitrary rather than just. Under the veil of ignorance and the original position Rawls contends that each person would choose a society where they would respected with dignity even if they are a minority group. Rawls concludes that utilitarianism contradicts these basic precepts of justice, particularly those that concern liberty and rights. A utilitarian society is simply regarded as an efficient means through which the spreading of benefits can occur, and does not take into account the difference between persons. “Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests” (p.3).

• Rawls, J., (1972), Theory of Justice, Clarendon Press, Oxford

The Reconciliation of Naturalism and Idealism in Ancient Greek Art

Reblogged from janetthomas:

To understand the reconciliation or meshing of ideas of philosophy and attitudes in the period when Greek art emerged from idealism to naturalism, one need only focus on the years 500 – 400 BCE. During this period Greece experienced a dramatic and vibrant change, not only in the arts, philosophy and politics but also in the everyday effect on people from all walks of life.

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Humans in Winter

 

Thomas, J.E, (2006), “Humans in Winter”, Encaustic on paper

The Conservative Spartans

How an adherence to dogma led to Spartan decline

Conservatism appeals to those who do not like to be unsettled. It is an appeal where custom is preferred over reason, and where things are so because they have always been so. Inherited customs that reinforce privileges and benefits on a few consecutive generations within a population are difficult to explain through rational means. So an appeal to tradition is one which demands a static lack of thought, and a state that relies upon such an appeal is liable to fall due to its lack of movement or change[1]. For the Spartans, the Lycurgan reforms of the 8^th century BCE were the only reforms that they were ever likely to need and they conformed religiously to them even after their defeat at Leuctra.

The Lycurgan reforms are attributed to Lycurgus, an obscure figure of around the eighth century who is known more through his works than his life. In about 800 BCE the Spartans, or Lacedaimonoi, were the inhabitants of about four villages in Lacedaimon ruled by two kings. Beneath the kings was an aristocracy whose role was to be the generals in war, the priests, judges and advisors, and to run a pyramidal household supported by lesser households. This was a common social dynamic throughout Greece at that time. In Sparta, this was termed the phratry. However, although the primitive elements of phratry were kept, the Lacedaimonoi practiced them with an aspect of communal education for children and communal life for adults which was unique amongst the Greek states[2]. Lycurgus was considered the lawmaker for the Lacedaimonoi and his laws were the basis for the constitution which Xenophon wrote about in the 4^th century BCE.

Xenophon begins his Constitutions of the Lacedaimonians with an account of the way Lycurgus thought women should uphold their primary duty that of bearing ‘fine children’. In order to produce ‘vigorous offspring’. Lycurgus thought that physical training through competitive games was as important for women as it was for men. Sexual intercourse between a man and a wife was to be kept to a bare minimum in order for desire to be increased, an element that Lycurgus also thought necessary for optimum reproduction. For the same reason, men were only allowed to take a wife whilst in their prime, and if an elderly man had a young wife he had to take into his house a suitable younger man to assist in reproduction. A man without a wife could also find an aristocratic married woman with whom he could father children with her husband’s consent. This was done in order that inheritance could be legitimately conferred through families and also so that the Lacedaimonoi would breed a premium race of people[3]. In comparison to the other Greek states these seemed like fairly radical reforms but they were conservative in the sense that the purpose of them was to reinforce and uphold the status quo within these tribal communities.

The sons of the Lacedaimonoi were taken from their households at six years and educated by older boys under the supervision of a warden until they were twenty. The purpose of their education was to make them as hardy as possible. Modesty, obedience, endurance, chastity and strategy were the chief characteristics that the Lacedaimonoi wished to imbue in their offspring[4]. As young men they graduated to a class of eirenes, not full citizens but liable for military service and engaged in training the next generation[5]. This emphasis on military training allowed the Lacedaimonoi to become renowned as an army and by the eighth century they had subjugated much of the people around them with the annexation of Laconia and Messenia. This produced increased state wealth and the development of an effective army which no longer relied upon the aristocracy for a military monopoly[6]. However, it was also reliant on a large slave population (helots) as its economy, unlike the rest of the Greek states, was largely agrarian-based. This new land needed a large non-Lacedaimonoi labour force which was difficult to control and seen as a constant threat[7].

While Xenophon points out the role of cooperation and sharing in the life of the Lacedaimonoi[8], and the subsequent corruption of this ideal in the Spartan society of his time[9], he neglects to mention that this was only practiced to a certain extent. The reforms of Lycurgus had implied a constitutional guarantee of equal political rights and equal allotments of public land (kleros) to all citizens. However, these so-called equalities were illusions with only a few being eligible to be part of the governing Gerousia, or senate, and the concurrent existence of private lots of land[10]. This situation was exacerbated in the period before the Spartan defeat at Leuctra in 371 BCE by subsequent gross inequalities in wealth of land after periods of Spartan military success. The kleros had to be sufficient to support the family and the helots that worked it, and also provide a contribution to the state. In the period after the 7^th century BCE the Lacedaimonoi had raised their standard of living as did their perioikoi, the citizens of the largely autonomous surrounding communities that provided the bulk of Spartan troops. The kleros was not conceived for luxury living and contributed to a decline in the birth-rate amongst the Lacedaimonoi[11].

So, while obedience to the state was a virtue which Spartans appeared to practice even after Leuctra, it was this unquestioning obedience that led to the eventual ‘sclerification’ of Sparta itself. Xenophon berates the latter generations of Lacedaimonoi of his time for their corruption through the accumulation of wealth, yet it was reliance upon a militaristic life underpinned by a static agricultural society dependent upon a large slave population that contributed to Spartan decline. The conservative appeal to persist with societal values that may no longer function was apparent in the decline of the Spartan birth-rate and the danger of revolt from a large underclass upon which the society was dependent for its success. Therefore, Xenophon’s history may be coloured with his concept of a golden Lacedaimon past, and his despondent view of contemporary Spartan society.

REFERENCES:

1. Forrest, W.C. (1969), A History of Sparta, Norton Library, N.Y
2. Scruton, R. (2006), Political Philosophy, Continuum International Publishing Group
3. Xenophon, The Constitution of the Lacedaimonians, in Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 7. E. C. Marchant, G. W. Bowersock, tr. Constitution of the Athenians. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. 1925. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=xen.+const.+lac.+1.1 , viewed on 25 February 2013

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[1] Scruton, R. (2006), Political Philosophy, Continuum International Publishing Group, pp. vii-viii

[2] Forrest, W.C. (1969), A History of Sparta: 950-192 B.C., Norton Library, p.40

[3] Xen. Const. Lac. 1

[4] Xen. Const. Lac. 2

[5] Forrest, (1969), p.53

[6] ibid. pp.58-62

[7] Forrest, (1969), pp.33-38

[8] Xen. Const. Lac. 6

[9] Xen. Const. Lac. 14

[10] Forrest, (1969), p.51

[11] ibid., p.136

Work begins

Reblogged from Nicholas Georgouras:

March, 2013- www.sculptor.com.au

The Wandjina's powers of creative regeneration

Reblogged from janetthomas:

“Whatever may be the age of these paintings, it is scarcely probable that they could have been executed by a self-taught savage.”
Sir George Grey, 1837
(Morphy, 1998:20)

Until recently, European history of Aboriginal art has given little to which one could reference as few art objects were collected and most were relegated to ethnographic novelty. Being the first European to document the Wandjina rock paintings in the Kimberley, Sir George Grey was quick to dismiss the idea that they were done by the local people because of the works’ apparent technical skill and startling aesthetics (Morphy, 1998:20).

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Neuroscience and the Law

Neuroscience is making advances in mapping our brain. In doing so, it questions our fundamental beliefs about our autonomy within the law. However, to date, it still has not been successful in undermining principles of justice that have underpinned Western legal systems and international treaties for the past centuries. This essay provides a study upon what difference neuroscience makes, or not, to the law.

 

Neuroscience is an advancement in cognitive studies which has up until a few decades ago relied mostly upon behavioural studies. Presently there are claims made by corporations involved in neuro-technologies that claim to be able to detect deception accurately, and also to assess whether people have tendencies towards criminality. To study the issue of whether neuroscience in this capacity will not make a difference to the law, this essay will study the history of the cognitive sciences in the law, the claims of Greene and Cohen (2004) that state neuroscience makes no difference to the law, the philosophical and ethical issues that are fundamental to society and the law, and the claims and criticisms made about neuro-technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This analysis concludes that for the foreseeable future neuroscience will make little difference to the law.

To assess whether neuroscience will not make a difference to the law it is necessary to look at the contributions that the cognitive sciences have made and whether they have helped to ascertain the responsibility of people under the law. The justice system relies upon defining the intentions of the defendant to judge whether they are guilty of breaching the law. To achieve this aim, often the cognitive sciences, such as psychology and psychiatry, are called upon for assistance. Eigen (2003, p.x) suggests that in the mid-nineteenth century it was not psychiatrists or legal professionals who identified the difference between insanity and the anomalous behaviour of unconsciousness, such as acts done whilst sleepwalking or from some other automatic reflex, it was the jury. It became necessary to have scientists ascertain the culpability of someone if there was a question of any mental disability, rather than have a non-professional jury assess this.

However, Eigen (2003, p.5) contends that during the nineteenth century, with more novel diagnoses becoming apparent at the courts, expert medical witnesses were at risk of twisting courtroom evidence and framing it within their own contexts. This threatened to displace the function of the jury and served as a critical point between the law and the emerging specialties and technologies of cognitive science.  According to Eigen (2003, p.6), there was an increasing judicial anxiety about insanity acquittals because of the growing diagnoses of different derangements that came before the courts explaining a person’s lack of accountability and moral agency. This is much like the contemporary dilemma with the use of new neuro-technologies and techniques that confront the law today in making assessments about people’s responsibility.  The question that arises is how much neuroscience should be included in the tools of the law for the aims of justice to be achieved.

Greene and Cohen (2004, p.1775) argue that neuroscience’s transformative effect on the law will come about by changing people’s understanding of the notion of ‘free will’. Free will is a problem because of our modern concept of the physical universe. They quote ( p.1777) Peter van Inwagen: “Determinism is true if the world is such that its current state is completely determined by i) the laws of physics, and ii) past states of the world. Therefore, if all is predetermined by physics then the idea of free will is an illusion.  However, although most philosophers and legal theorists accept determinism, many also find it compatible with free will. According to Greene and Cohen ( p.1777), compatibilists claim that free will is a persistent notion that is undeniable and that it is up to science to establish how it works. Greene and Cohen (p.1778) state that the standard legal account of punishment is compatibilist in order to allow for retribution. For Greene and Cohen (p.1779), neuroscience will not change the law because the law assumes a level of minimal rationality for people’s behaviour, rather than notions of free will. They go on to state that if neuroscience supports minimal rationality then there is no reason to think that it poses a threat to the determination of criminal responsibility (p.1779). Although new syndromes are announced as an excuse for criminal behaviour they will only have validity if they undermine one’s rationality in a significant way. Greene and Cohen (p. 1780) argue that neuroscience can be helpful in this way through being able to correlate behaviour with rationality and also helping people understand the mechanical nature of human action. Neuroscience promises to show the ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘how’ of the mechanical process to be able to assess if someone truly deserves to be punished or if they are just a victim of their neuronal circumstances (p.1780). However, this type of technology may have profound impacts upon the ethical concepts that humans have formed over time in their societies, especially ones that pertain to the autonomy of the individual.

Philosophical and ethical thinking can help to align the law with the sciences through providing the tools with which to develop theories of responsibility and also assessing the ethics of new technologies (Tovino, 2007). Through the use of such studies, legislative, regulatory and judicial bodies can correlate legal processes with technological processes in an ethical manner, in particular when functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is combined with philosophical ethics (2007, p.44). This technology localizes changes in blood oxygenation in the brain and is used in neuroscience to map sensory, motor and cognitive function, and also physical and mental health conditions, behaviours and characteristics (p.44). The legal issues of fMRI extend beyond patient-physician relationships to confidentiality, privacy and research ethics (p.44).

Some have referred to fMRI as being too reliant upon interpretation to be reliable as evidence (Bizzi et al., 2009). As is noted by Tovino (2007, p.47), ‘Sometimes the difference between seeing higher activity in the parietal lobe compared to the occipital lobe is akin to deciding whether Van Gogh or Matisse is the more colourful artist’.  Tovino (p. 47) also includes a quote from Donaldson: ‘What constitutes a “significantly greater” activation is in a way in the eye of the beholder’. With commercial fMRI companies claiming up to 99% infallibility and areas of use to include risk reduction in dating, insurance verification and employee screening, privacy and confidentiality also become issues, especially if these claims are misleading (p.47). Tovino (p.48) quotes Greely and the U.S. Committee on Science and Law in stating that advances in fMRI threaten ‘to invade the last inviolate area of “self” and have been coined as ‘neuroprivacy’ issues.  Therefore, the questions that Tovino poses are: Is it deceptive to say that an fMRI test is objective, fully automated and infallible? (p.47), and: Will future fMRI tests require heightened confidentiality and privacy protections? (p.48).

These are important questions because of expressions of rights of freedom constructed in international treaties. In Stacy v Georgia, the seminal ‘privacy of thought’ case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that, ‘also fundamental is the right to be free, expect on very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy’ (Glenn, 2005, p.61). That Court also states in Lawrence v Texas: ‘Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, expression and certain intimate conduct’ (2005, p.61). A fundamental principle of democracy is our accusatory system of criminal justice, which demands that the government in seeking to establish the guilt of an individual produce evidence against him/her by their own independent labours, rather than by compelling it from his/her own mouth (Miranda v Arizona, 1966 at 460) (Tovino, 2007, p.50).

However, some objections to fMRI being argued against on these self-incrimination grounds are that DNA, blood tests, mental examinations, urinalysis, fingerprints are all means of admissible evidence that are used in courts today, so why not fMRI (Tovino, 2007, p.51)? Some questions for counterarguments could be: Does this address the implications involved in seizing an individual’s ‘privacy of thought’? Is fMRI reliable and accurate in identifying or diagnosing physical and mental conditions, behaviours or characteristics? Are such tests as effective as DNA or blood and alcohol tests, or are there more effective methods of identifying target condition? Also, who would be the authority that could gather such data from a brain scan and what precautions and protocols should be followed (p.51)? Although neuro-imaging has been effective in showing courts the diminished responsibility of adolescents on death row (p.52), and discovering brain tumors that may affect responsibility (Burns, 2003, p.48), many lawyers still argue that data gathered from fMRI should not be legally admissible evidence (Tovino, 2007, p.53).

For some philosophers, the citation of neuro-technologies, such as fMRI, as evidence in law is problematic. Fine (2010, 281) states that the problem with advances in neurosciences is that ‘we still have minimal understanding of how neural structures contribute to complex psychological phenomena’. The complex nature of brain structure makes it difficult to attribute behavioural conditions or characteristics to it.  Statistics and data gathered from procedures that involve neuro-technologies may be inadequate or inappropriate (p.281), especially for making assumptions with which to convict someone. Too many assumptions are made about a structure that is extremely complex and massively interconnected to imply a psychological construct that leads to an individual’s imprisonment.

Fine (2010, p.281) contends that inferring a mental process from a significant oxygenation of a particular area of the brain is a reverse inference and fraught with too many difficulties to attribute specific brain functions to various brain regions. For Fine (p.281), the entire brain may not be involved in a particular function and ‘there is no one-to-one mapping between brain regions and psychological processes. Cognition arises through complex interaction of brain areas, with any single region being involved in a number of processes (p.281). This makes it ambiguous as to the amount of psychological implications that can be derived from the amount of activity in particular regions of the brain. Also data acquisition from fMRI is slow which limits psychological interpretations that can be inferred from brain events (p.282). Weisberg et al. (2008, p.20) states that neuroscience has an appeal that relies upon assumptions of infallibility which allows people to find circular explanations of psychological phenomena from information about brain responses acceptable. This is problematic in a courtroom where a judge or jury might accept such scientific evidence without further validation.

Deception detection is one of the areas hailed by those who use fMRI commercially as able to revolutionize testimony in court. However, there is some doubt as to the veracity of such claims. Kanwisher (2009, p.11) points to three exceptionally successful individual subject studies that have been conducted. These three studies analysed two sets of fMRI data that were used to distinguish lies form truth (p.11). However, according to Kanwisher (p.11) in two of the studies lies were not examined but target deception events. From the successful outcomes of these studies, with correct response rates of 90%, 76% and 89% respectively, it appears that classification and imaging methods are rapidly improving (p.11). However, Kanwisher (p.12) points out that this success rate may not be able to be reflected in the real world, and argues that lie detection within a laboratory environment is completely different to lie detection in the real world. Firstly, the subjects are making an instructed false response not a lie. Secondly, real life situations differ in that the stakes are much higher for the subjects. This could cause anxiety whether a subject was guilty or not (p.12). Also, a subject could be uncooperative and fMRI is useless if a subject moves at all (p.12). It would be impossible for such studies to even remotely mimic real life situations as they would need a subject population of defendants suspected of serious crimes. Also, the experimenter would need to know whether the subject was lying for verification of the test (p.12). Therefore it seems impossible to conduct studies to mimic real life situations for ethical and practical reasons.

As neuro-technologies become more advanced they could indeed show us, as Greene and Cohen assert, that our actions are predetermined. However, for an ordered society the law requires us to be responsible for our actions and for this it requires minimal rationality. Behavioural psychologists and psychiatrists are already able to assess people’s minimal, rational psychological states. Neuro-technologies, such as fMRI can also show physical disabilities within the brain. However, for the foreseeable future, to use fMRI  for such purposes as deception detection or to assess whether people have a tendency towards criminal behaviour is spurious. Therefore, neuroscience makes little difference to the law.

 

 

 

 

REFERENCES

 

1. Eigen, J.P., (2003) Unconscious crime: Mental absence and criminal responsibility in Victorian London, John Hopkins University Press, Maryland
2. Green and Cohen, (2004), For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything, Princeton University, Princeton
3. Tovino, S. A., (2007), “Functional neuroimaging and the law: Trends and directions for future scholarship”, American Journal of Bioethics , 7:9 , 2007 , pp.44-56
4. Glenn, L. M. (2005), Keeping an open mind: What legal safeguards are needed? American Journal of Bioethics 5(2), p.60-61
5. Burns, Jeffrey M; Swerdlow, Russell H. (2003), “Right orbitofrontal tumor with pedophilia symptom and constructional apraxia sign” Archives of Neurology , 60:3 , 2003 , 437-440
6. Fine, C. (2010) “From scanner to sound bite: Issues in interpreting and reporting sex differences in the brain” Current Directions in Psychological Science , 19:5 , 2010 , 280-283
7. Weisberg, D.S., Keil, F.C., Goodstein, J., Rawson, E., & Gray, J.R. (2008), “The seductive allure of neuroscience explanations” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 470–477.
8. Kanwisher, N.  (2009), “The Use of fMRI in Lie Detection: What Has Been Shown and What Has Not”, Bizzi et al., 2009, Using Imaging to Detect Deceit: Scientific and Ethical Questions, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge MA